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ARTICLES:

- (1) Nuclear verification process still over the horizon

SANKEI (Page 7) (Full)
February 4, 2009

Takashi Arimoto, Washington

U.S. President Obama had a telephone conversation on Feb. 2 with South Korean President Lee Myung Bak, during which the two leaders agreed to keep pressing North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and nuclear development programs in a verifiable way through the six-party talks. The Obama administration is expected to push ahead with the six-party talks while holding bilateral talks with North Korea. But the question is how to establish a framework for the

verification of North Korea's nuclear facilities, a challenge left over from the former Bush administration. The answer is still over the horizon.

According to the South Korean government's press release, Obama told Lee that he would send Secretary of State Clinton to South Korea in mid-February. Clinton will also visit Japan and China around her visit to Seoul to exchange views with her Japanese and Chinese counterparts on how to negotiate with North Korea from now on.

The U.S. State Department is now going over its North Korea policy while hearing its officials in charge of negotiations, with the new administration having come into office,

"It's a wrong argument to choose between the six-party talks and the United States' direct talks with North Korea," Balbina Hwang, a former senior adviser to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the State Department, told the Sankei Shimbun in an interview. Hwang tackled North Korea issues until January. She stressed that the United States should also push for its talks with North Korea in a proactive way under the six-party talks.

At the six-party talks in December last year, the United States and other six-party members called for North Korea's commitment in writing to the verification process. However, North Korea disagreed.

"North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan (who is North Korea's chief delegate to the six-party talks) said (in October's talks between the U.S. and North Korea) that North Korea would

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accept the verification process. But the North Korean delegation is only made up of officials from its foreign ministry. It does not reflect the intention of North Korea as a whole." With this, Hwang implied that there is a limit to Kim's negotiating authority.

According to Hwang, the U.S. government made formal and informal proposals each time to the North Korean government for getting in touch with the North Korean military before sitting down at the negotiating table. Furthermore, whenever the six-party talks were held, the U.S. delegation always had U.S. military officers attend the talks, thereby indicating that the United States is always ready to talk with the North Korean military. However, North Korea did not comply with the proposal.

In the meantime, Hwang made suggestions for the Obama administration, maintaining that the United States should first hold trilateral talks with Japan and South Korea and that it is important to confirm the three countries' unity. In this sense, Hwang said, Clinton's tour of East Asian countries is "very good." Furthermore, she noted that the U.S. government had some problems in its interdepartmental cooperation under the former Bush administration. In this regard, she indicated that the Obama administration should appoint a high-level envoy to coordinate its North Korea policy within the U.S. government.

(2) Japan's think tanks: Idea of merger triggered by financial difficulties; Human resources not developed

YOMIURI (Page 13) (Abridged slightly)
February 4, 2009

Masahiko Sasajima, Yomiuri Research Institute

An idea has emerged to combine some private-sector policy research institutes (think tanks) in Japan that are specialized in foreign and security policies.

Main points

The idea resulted from a lack of funds for activities. The aim is to increase the own fund of the envisaged new think tank.

In order to aim at a nonprofit research institute independent of the government, cultivating human resources and having the ability

to externally transmit information are essential.

Yukio Sato, former president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), has nurtured this idea over the last five years. A report proposing the merger that has been released recently has created a stir among those concerned.

JIIA's budget consists of subsidies from the Foreign Ministry and its own fund. In fiscal 2007, subsidies from the Foreign Ministry totaled 420 million yen and own fund 150 million yen. Its own fund has declined about 60 PERCENT over the last five years. The decline is ascribable to sharp drops in projects commissioned by the Foreign Ministry and in corporate membership fees amid economic recession. This has forced JIIA to scale back on its research projects and give up on the planned publication of its research results. JIIA is highly alarmed, with Sato saying, "If this situation persists, we would have to reduce the scale of our research activities."

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As a result, JIIA has come up with the idea of increasing the overall fund by merging with other research institutes specializing in foreign and security policies into a new organization. On the mind is banding together with the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), and the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS). The three organizations are dismissive of the idea. IIPS President Yoshio Okawara articulately denied the option, saying: "The spirit and nature of each institute is different, so the merger is difficult. We cannot buy the idea."

JIIA was founded in 1959 at former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's initiative as an institute dedicated to researching Japan's national interests and security policy. In reality, JIIA's activities have been centered on promoting exchanges with foreign research institutes with the help of scholars. The UK-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) was established at around the same time. The Japanese think tank is way behind IISS, which has earned a solid international reputation for the publication of The Military Balance. Compared to Western countries, Japanese research institutes are all suffering from fund shortages and have been inactive in nurturing human resources, making policy proposals, and providing government organizations with human sources.

In the United States, private think tanks are thriving. Funded by individuals and corporations, think tanks in the United States are vying with each other over new ideas and influence through their policy studies and proposals. For instance, the Obama administration's advocacy of using "smart power" is based on a proposal by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Further, under the political appointee system, Susan Rice, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, has been appointed ambassador to the United Nations.

Although JIIA's proposal was triggered by financial difficulties, its real challenge is to foster research fellows capable of making policy proposals to the government and to acquire the ability to transmit information externally. Kyoto University Professor Hiroshi Nakanishi noted: "The weak intellectual and economic foundations supporting the think tanks are a challenge."

Think tanks in Japan do not function well because bureaucrats keep a tight grip on information and authority. It is essential for democratic society to have the function to transmit information to the people and expand the circle of policy debates from a private-sector position distinct from academic studies.

If the political appointee system is widely introduced as a result of civil service reform, think tanks in Japan would become a source of political appointees. The time has come to review the measures to expand that role from a broader perspective.

Major Japanese think tanks specializing in foreign and security policies

Name Number of researchers Annual budget

Japan Institute of International Affairs 10
13 guest researchers 570 million yen
Institute for International Policy Studies 14 270 million yen
Japan Forum on International Relations 12 190 million yen
Research Institute for Peace and Security 20 (mostly university professors) 96 million yen

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Brookings Institution 96
Over 200, including guest researchers 32.55 billion yen

(3) Autobiography of former Ambassador Howard Baker: Japan willing to provide support to U.S.-led campaign against terrorism

NIKKEI (Page 36) (Full)
January 27, 2009

I think that Americans living in modern history will never forget Sept. 11, 2001.

When terrorists launched the nightmarish attacks on Washington, the capital of the U.S., and New York that morning, I was at an airport in Chicago with my wife, Nancy, on my way back to Japan after attending a ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and seeing my children and grandchildren in my home state of Tennessee.

Terrorists hijacked airliners and crashed the planes into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in Manhattan, New York, and another airliner struck into the Pentagon in Washington. Upon learning the details of the plot by al-Qaeda, an international terrorist group, the U.S. government issued an order to ban all flights across the nation, and we were stranded in Chicago. We finally arrived in Japan on the afternoon of Sept. 15.

On the morning of Sept. 17, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the U.S. Embassy to offer condolences for those victimized in the terrorist attacks. At that time, the prime minister said: "Japan is willing to render necessary support. Providing support is the responsibility of Japan as an ally." I responded: "The United States and Japan are real friends. Both countries must face this challenge in close cooperation with other countries." I also told Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka: "Japan is a powerful ally of and a country friendly to the United States. We hope Japan will provide support in a way that represents such a relationship."

Prime Minister Koizumi held a press conference at the Prime Minister's Official Residence on the night of Sept. 19 and announced the nation's seven-point assistance package to back up the U.S.-led antiterrorism campaign. The package included a pledge to make necessary legal changes to enable the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to provide rear support if U.S. and other foreign forces launch a retaliatory offensive. It also included measures to quickly dispatch SDF vessels to the Indian Ocean for an intelligence-gathering mission and provide emergency economic aid to India and Pakistan.

Cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the war on terror further strengthened through a retaliatory attack against the Taliban in Afghanistan and other operations. In late October, after the collapse of the Taliban regime, I frequently met Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, who shored up the Koizumi administration, to exchange in-depth views on what specific measures Japan should take based on the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, which is still a key political theme in Japan.

The basic plan by the Koizumi administration to support the U.S. military did not include a plan to dispatch an Aegis-equipped destroyer of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean. Although I had anticipated that Japan would decide to do so, I tried

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to refrain from expressing this desire, emphasizing: "Since Japan as a sovereign nation made the decision, we will not tell Japan to do

this or that." This stance was the basis of the Bush administration's policy toward Japan from the start, so I had no intention to change this policy stance.

One scene I saw when I returned to the U.S. Embassy in Akasaka, Tokyo after the long journey in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks has been deeply fixed in my mind. I saw innumerable Japanese people gathering in front of our embassy to express their condolences.

Both the U.S. and Japan have respected each other and have established a favorable relationship despite different cultures, customs, and religions, needless to say about the tragedy of the past war. The gathering of so many people around the U.S. embassy reminded me of the deep ties between the two countries over more than a half century.

(4) Politics demoralizes SDF personnel

SANKEI (Page 11) (Full)
February 3, 2009

Masashi Nishihara, president of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS)

In my recent contacts with some of the ranking officers of the Self-Defense Forces, I noticed that their morale was down. Over the past year or so, there were a number of problems, such as the leakage of confidential data about an Aegis ship, a Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer's collision with a fishing boat, and Air Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff Tamogami's remarks. However, I heard from them that the SDF's frustration does not stem so much from being criticized for such incidents but is attributable more to the unwillingness of politicians to understand the SDF's tasks and hardships.

Such frustration, if left as is, will not only demoralize SDF members but will also undermine the SDF as the mainstay for Japan's national defense. Any country's armed forces will not feel like doing a difficult mission at the price of their lives if there is no strong support from the people and their representatives (i.e., government and parliament). For the SDF's samurai warriors, honor comes before anything else.

First and foremost, those in the SDF are frustrated with their status under the Constitution. They wonder if they are really an "armed force." None of the politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party, the New Komeito, and the Democratic Party of Japan will give a clear-cut answer to that fundamental question. Politicians are little aware that their negligence has been damaging the sensitivities of SDF members. It is truly regrettable.

Secondly, Ground and Air Self-Defense Force members were sent to a "noncombat area" in Iraq. Politicians might simply think to themselves that this noncombat area was a "safe" place. This is another reason for the frustration of SDF personnel. SDF members were sent to Iraq under the Iraq Special Measures Law. In Iraq, they were tasked with a difficult mission to carry out in a "noncombat area." Those SDF members accomplished the mission with flying colors. Moreover, they all came back to Japan safely without any

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loss of life.

However, the "noncombat area" is defined simply as an area where no battle is going on. Actually, that area was not free from danger at all.

The GSDF therefore had to guard its local camp in its own way. In point of fact, the GSDF camp came under rocket attacks. The same can be said of the ASDF. Aircraft flying at a low altitude shortly after taking off or before landing are in danger of encountering rocket attacks from the ground. Given such danger, the ASDF C-130 cargo planes zoomed up in their takeoffs and spiraled with a random steep approach (RSA) in their landings at Baghdad Airport and other airports.

This—according to one SDF staff officer's account—requires a high level of piloting techniques. The ASDF pilots on the airlift mission in Iraq have done this 800 times without encountering any attack for five years. The SDF staff officer contended that this is "a result of training" and is "a result of strong their willingness to complete the mission." However, politicians have shown no understanding. This dissatisfies the SDF officer.

If the SDF had come under attack in Iraq, the opposition parties would have put the blame on the government by claiming that it was not a noncombat area and it was a violation of the law. In addition, the government might have reproved the SDF for a misjudgment of the situation. For fear of this, the SDF officer said. This is also a reason for politicians' lack of understanding.

Third, the government imposes the "irrational" guidelines on the SDF to restrict its use of weapons. Politicians, however, do not think such guidelines are irrational. The SDF officer is dissatisfied with this.

The government is now preparing to send SDF vessels in order to crack down on pirates in waters off the coast of Somalia. It looks like the government will task the SDF vessels with a mission to protect only Japanese ships and Japan-linked ships until a new law is enacted.

In addition, the government is going to apply the weapons use guidelines that will not allow the SDF vessels to fire on pirates or pirate ships even in the face of danger unless its "legitimate self-defense" is clear.

The government plans to create a new law, under which the SDF will be allowed to protect foreign ships and will be also allowed to fire on pirate ships and capture them. This legislation would face opposition from the New Komeito and the Democratic Party of Japan, however. The government would therefore have to set strict guidelines for the SDF's use of weapons.

However, that will result in creating an irrational law to put an excessive hoop on the SDF vessels in their antipiracy activities. None of the political parties would think in this way. In that case, an SDF vessel on an antipiracy mission could be abducted. That is an unamusing joke.

Then, what if a foreign ship asks for help? One possible response might be "that's not our mission until a new law is in place." Is

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this all the SDF can say to that foreign ship? All the SDF can do is to extend minimal cooperation? If that is the case, such security policing is unacceptable in the international community. Moreover, the SDF members there will only be put out of countenance.

Politicians should lose no time in responding to the SDF members' reasonable frustration. It is extremely unhealthy to keep them frustrated. I hope politicians will understand their hardships and encourage them. Politicians must create a political environment in which the SDF members can be willing to carry out their missions, or they will not feel like living for the defense of Japan.

The SDF is an entity of armed forces. Based on this political judgment, politicians should make the SDF and its members take pride. This is the first step to civilian control.

(5) Where is the reduced burden? Town criticizes increased noise at Kadena Air Base; 126 aircraft arrived at Kadena, 30 planes moved out of prefecture for exercises

OKINAWA TIMES (Page 25) (Full)
February 3, 2009

Kadena

"The relocation of training" has been referred to as a showcase to

reduce the burden in the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. The relocation of Kadena Air Base's F-15s to an Air Self-Defense Force base outside Okinawa started in March 2007. To date, a total of 30 F-15s have taken part in seven cases. At the same time, according to Kadena Town, since 2007 at least 126 aircrafts, including fighters, have come from outside the prefecture, increasing the noise. The town criticized the situation, with one saying: "The number of aircrafts that have come to the prefecture is far greater than that of aircrafts moved out of the prefecture. Reality is a far cry from a reduction in the burden."

(Kenya Fukusato)

The relocation of training was incorporated in an agreement reached in 2006 between Japan and the United States.

According to the Okinawa Defense Bureau, (the relocation of training) first took place at ASDF Tsuiki Base (Fukuoka Prefecture), followed by Komatsu (Ishikawa Prefecture), Misawa (Aomori Prefecture), Nyutabaru (Miyazaki Prefecture), and Chitose (Hokkaido).

Meanwhile, 12 F-22A Raptors, the U.S. Air Force's state-of-the-art stealth fighters, were temporarily deployed at Kadena Air Base for about three months starting in February 2007. F-22A Raptors have been temporarily redeployed at the base since January this year.

The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps conducted joint rapid response exercises in December 2007 and December 2008 in which some 30 aircrafts, including FA-18 fighters and AV-8 Harriers, vertical short takeoff and landing fighter/attack aircraft, came from the Iwakuni base. They repeatedly conducted exercises based at Kadena Air Base.

According to Kadena Town, relocated training kept F-15s out of the prefecture for a total of 36 days. The average number of daily

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occurrences of noise for fiscal 2006 was 109. Of those 36 days, 24 days recorded frequencies greater than the average. Only four days fell below the average, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and local high school entrance examination days for which the local municipality asked not to conduct exercises.

Kadena Mayor Tokujitsu Miyagi said: "The Japanese government has pledged to lessen the burden, but in reality, the burden has clearly grown. A reduction in noise, which is what the residents want most, has yet to be realized. I will negotiate with the government to make efforts to alleviate the burden while showing data."

Aircraft from outside Okinawa

February 2007 F-22A 12 aircrafts
December 2007 FA-18 30
March 2008 F-16 12
June 2008 Harrier 6
July 2008 FA-18 9
July 2008 Harrier 5
November 2008 FA-18 16
November 2008 Harrier 6
December 2008 FA-18 8
January 2009 F-22A 12
January 2009 F-16 10

Relocated F-15 exercises

| Period | New location | Number of aircrafts |
|--------------------|--------------|---------------------|
| 3/5/07 - 3/8/07 | Tsuiki | 5 |
| 5/16/07 - 5/23/07 | Komatsu | 5 |
| 7/16/07 - 7/21/07 | Misawa | 5 |
| 9/3/07 - 9/4/07 | Nyutabaru | 2 |
| 7/23/08 - 7/30/08 | Misawa | 6 |
| 9/2/08 - 9/4/08 | Nyutabaru | 2 |
| 12/8/08 - 12/12/08 | Chitose | 5 |

ZUMWALT